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NOTES
Minority Indigenous Populations and Their Claims
for Self-Determination
This paper analyzes the problems and international legal consequences
of claims for self-determination by indigenous' minorities. Recent as-
sertions for self-determination by the minority populations of indigenous
Melanesians2 on the South Pacific islands of Fiji3 and New Caledonia4
have accelerated concern over this issue, due to both the relative success
of these peoples in achieving their goals5 and the international legal
problems that these assertions present in a bipolar world.6
I As a term of art, "indigenous" is given several meanings throughout this Note. The Fijians
claim that "indigenous" refers only to those persons descended from the original Fiji Islanders. See
infra note 45 and accompanying text; Fiian Army Leader Stages 2d Coup, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26,
1987, at L3, col. 1. The New Caledonians claim that "indigenous" refers to persons who have
resided in New Caledonia for a certain amount of time. See infra note 21. Regardless of these
differences in interpretation, the notion that "indigenous" relates to persons descended from those
groups which have long populated the particular area is the approach taken by this paper.
2 See Markham, New Caledonia Votes to Remain French Territory, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1987,
at 7, col. 1.
3 The Fijians made their assertion in autumn 1987. See infra Part I of this Note for a factual
description of the situation in Fiji.
4 New Caledonia has been in turmoil since at least 1984, but it was only in 1987, in light of
Fijian assertions, that the New Caledonians' position became apparent as one for indigenous self-
determination. See infra Part I of this Note for a description of the situation in New Caledonia.
5 In Fiji, the indigenous population successfully overthrew the government. See, e.g., Ming-
shan, China Views "Wakening of Aspirations" in South Pacific in 1987, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Jan. 1, 1988 (summarizing Xinhua radio broadcast in English, Dec. 30, 1987, at 0249
gmt) (NEXIS).
In New Caledonia, the indigenous population has received international support despite failing
to win their independence from France as of yet. See, eg., O'Loughlin, Pacific Countries Take New
Caledonia Issue to United Nations, Associated Press, Aug. 8, 1986 (am cycle) (NEXIS); UN. Calls
on France to Free New Caledonia Colony, Reuter Library Report, Oct. 28, 1987 (pm cycle) (NEXIS)
[hereinafter U.N. Calls on France]. However, somewhat autonomous regional self-rule within New
Caledonia has been agreed on by all sides, with a referendum to be held in 1998 on the issue of self-
determination. Kamm, Noumea Journal: On an Island in the Pacific, but Far from at Peace, N.Y.
Times, July 26, 1988, at A4, col. 3.
6 Indigenous self-determination is a concept in conflict with sovereignty. Sovereignty, the cor-
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L LV
I. A TALE OF Two ISLANDS: NEW CALEDONIA AND FIJI
New Caledonia, a French possession since 1853' and an overseas
territory since 1946,8 consists of a group of islands located approximately
1,350 miles northeast of Sydney, Australia9 with a population of approxi-
mately 160,000.10 Fiji, a former British colony,' 1 is now a South Pacific
nation of approximately 715,000 inhabitants.12 The indigenous groups' 3
in each of these archipelagos are slightly outnumbered by the combined
population of the various nonindigenous groups.14
A. New Caledonia
In 1984, the long-smoldering independence movement of New Cale-
donia's aboriginal Melanesians, the Kanaks, erupted into bloody vio-
lence.' 5 The death toll has slowed, but the violence continues.' 6 Since
1984, France has been attempting to work out a solution to the violence
generated by the Kanak independence movement. 17
nerstone of international law, is the doctrine which forbids meddling in the internal affairs of states
and makes all states equal in international affairs.
7 Separatist Set Up New Government (sic), UPI, Dec. 1, 1984 (am cycle) (NEXIS).
8 Korionov, International Survey: On an "Overseas Territory," Pravda, Dec. 9, 1984, at 4, re-
printed in XXXVI CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, No. 49, at 17 (Jan. 2, 1985) (NEXIS).
9 O'Loughlin, Pacific Countries, supra note 5.
10 Separatist Set Up New Government, supra note 7.
11 Gordon, The Legal System ofFifi, 2 MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA 71, 76 (1984).
See also Fijian Army Leader Stages 2nd Coup, supra note 1.
12 The 1973 census put the population figure at 554,000. Gordon, supra note 11, at 76. By
1987 the population was estimated to be between 715,000 and 720,000. See Raines, Queen Elizabeth
Asserts Role As True Fjian Head of State, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1987, at A4, col. 1. See also
KCWD/KALEIDOScoPE: Fill (1989) (NEXIS).
13 See supra note 1. Interestingly, there are no real "indigenous" Fijians. The Islanders are a
mix of Papuans, Melanesians, Polynesians and Micronesians. Gordon, supra note 11, at 75.
14 Fjian Army Leader Stages 2nd Coup, supra note 1. Fiji has a population of approximately
714,000 people with indigenous, Melanesian Fijians slightly outnumbered by ethnic Indians. Id.
Indians comprise 50%, Fijians(Melanesians) 45%, Europeans 2.12%, Rotumans 1.22%, Chinese
.68% and others .08% of the population. KCWD/KALEIDOSCOPE: Fui, supra note 12. See also
Gordon, supra note 11, at 76.
New Caledonia has a population of approximately 150,000, 44% of which are native Melane-
sian Kanaks; of the remaining 56% most are whiteskinned Frenchmen. Donnet, Separatists Contest
Validity of New Caledonia Independence Vote, Associated Press, Aug. 31, 1987 (am cycle) (NEXIS).
The French came as colonists to exploit the mineral resources of New Caledonia, which is especially
rich in nickel. Graham, Matignon Accord Brings Uneasy Peace to New Caledonia, Financial Times,
Aug. 5, 1988, § I (European News), at 2.
15 Markham, supra note 2.
16 See, e.g., Twenty Police Injured, Hostages Taken in New Caledonia Clash, Reuter Library
Report, Feb. 22, 1988 (pm cycle) (NEXIS) [hereinafter Twenty Police Injured]; see also Nationalist
Slain in New Caledonia, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1989, at 4, col. 1.
17 See, e.g., Separatist Set Up New Government, supra note 7 (President Mitterrand of France
sends special envoy to New Caledonia to diffuse situation); Lower House Narrowly Passes Autonomy
Bill, Associated Press, Nov. 25, 1987 (am cycle) (NEXIS); Rosemberg, French Envoy Outlines Con-
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The French solution was to hold a plebiscite"8 on self-determination
in New Caledonia." This plebiscite was proposed as a one person, one
vote referendum.'0 The Kanaks insisted that only native New Caledoni-
ans be allowed to vote in the referendum.2' When the French refused to
accede to this demand, 2 the Kanaks refused to vote on the issue and
boycotted the referendum. 3 The results of the referendum, which was
held on September 13, 1987, overwhelmingly favored New Caledonia re-
maining a French Department.24 Rather than solving the problem, the
referendum backfired, further polarizing the islanders and eliciting nega-
tive responses from the world community. 5
Even before the referendum, the South Pacific Forum, a thirteen-
nation regional group, had raised the issue of New Caledonian indepen-
dence in the United Nations. 6 In 1986, the U.N. General Assembly had
passed a resolution supporting the Kanaks' claim for independence from
France.2 7 Then, in October 1987, after the referendum in New Caledo-
ditions For New Caledonian Self-Rule, Reuters North European Service, Dec. 20, 1984 (am cycle)
(NEXIS). The French on the islands are striving to maintain the status quo. Donnet, supra note 14.
The Kanaks want the decision to be theirs. Duverger, New Caledonia Referendum May Prove Major
Blunder, Manchester Guardian Weekly, Sept. 13, 1987, at 14 (NEXIS).
18 "Plebiscite. A vote of the people expressing their choice for or against a proposed law or
enactment, submitted to them, and'which, if adopted, will work a change in the constitution, or
which is beyond the powers of the regular legislative body." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1038 (5th
ed. 1979).
19 Duverger, supra note 17.
20 Id.
21 Markham, supra note 2.
The Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front ["FLNKS"], the major independence
group, had demanded that any referendum only include first-generation settlers - a stipu-
lation that would have excluded some [twenty] percent of the population born outside the
islands.
Id. The FLNKS meant, of course, in addition to indigenous, Melanesian Kanaks, only those non-
Kanaks who had been born in New Caledonia or born of residents of New Caledonia would be able
to vote.
22 Donnet, supra note 14. The French government ruled that "any French citizen who has
lived on New Caledonia at least three years is eligible to vote." Id.
23 Sherwell, Australia Joins Attack on New Caledonia Referendum, Financial Times, Sept. 15,
1987, at 4 (NEXIS) [hereinafter Australia Joins Attack]. The leader of the boycott movement, Jean-
Marie Tjibaou, claimed that 83% of the Kanaks refused to vote. Id.
24 France's Pacific Image, Manchester Guardian Weekly, Sept. 20, 1987, at 11 (NEXIS)
(58.99% of the electorate voted, with 98.3% in favor of remaining a French territory).
25 See, e.g., U.N. Calls on France, supra note 5; Australia Joins Attack, supra note 23; Papua
New Guinea Blasts France on New Caledonia, Nuclear Tests, Reuter Library Report, Oct. 7, 1987
(pm cycle) (NEXIS); Samoan Criticizes France Over New Caledonia, Reuter Library Report, Oct. 9,
1987 (am cycle) (NEXIS).
26 O'Loughlin, supra note 5. The Forum, a group consisting mainly of tiny island nations, was
concerned with French policy in the Pacific, especially the reduction in powers of the New Caledo-
nian regional assemblies which had been a true source of Kanak political power. Id.
27 Japan to Abstain in U.N. on New Caledonia Independence Vote, Asahi News Service, Oct. 28,
1987 (NEXIS). "The U.N. General Assembly voted 89-24 on a resolution to declare New Caledonia
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L LV
nia, a U.N. committee voted to resubmit the issue to the General As-
sembly.2 Again, the General Assembly passed a resolution affirming
New Caledonia's "inalienable right to self-determination and indepen
dence."29
France stressed that almost two-thirds of the members of the United
Nations had not voted against them,30 and proceeded with its longstand-
ing plan of granting New Caledonia more autonomy. 31 Notwithstanding
France's refusal to accede to Kanak demands for independence and
Kanak threats to boycott the presidential and regional elections in April
1988,32 relations between New Caledonia's neighbors and France began
improving.33
In the spring of 1988, with the reelection of socialist President Mit-
terrand in France, moves towards peace between France and the Kanaks
resumed. In June of 1988, an agreement was reached between the
French government and Kanak leaders for a ten year plan leading to
another self-determination referendum. 34 The accord provided for direct
rule from France in the first year, with moves toward autonomous re-
gional rule favoring the Kanaks in the second through ninth years, and a
self-determination referendum in 1998, the tenth year.35  The election
rules for the 1998 referendum would allow only those persons now quali-
fied to vote, plus any person already on the islands who would reach
a non-self-governing territory subject to U.N. decolonisation procedures." Daniel, New Caledonia
Polls May Threaten South Pacific Peace, Reuter Library Report, Apr. 19, 1988 (bc cycle) (NEXIS).
28 U.N. Calls on France, supra note 5. "The resolution [was] passed 69-27 by the U.N.'s com-
mittee on decolonisation .... Forty-six nations abstained." Id.
29 France Welcomes "Very Satisfying" U.N. Caledonia Vote, Reuter Library Report, Dec. 4,
1987 (am cycle) (NEXIS). "The draft was approved by 69 votes to 29, with 47 abstentions." Id.
30 Id. "France [however] welcomed [the] vote taken in the United Nations ... , saying 90 out
of 158 member states had refused to support moves to grant independence." Id.
31 Lower House Narrowly Passes Autonomy Bill, supra note 17.
The [autonomy] statute maintains the policy of giving more powers to the island, a
practice begun in 1985 by the former Socialist government. However, it provides assur-
ances that anti-independence forces will control at least two of New Caledonia's four re-
gions. Three of those regions have been controlled by the Kanak Socialist National
Liberation Front, which is seeking independence.
The Kanaks ... have spoken out against the autonomy statute, and President Fran-
gois Mitterrand, a Socialist, criticized it.
Id.
32 Twenty Police Injured, supra note 16.
33 See, e.g., Australia and France Decide to Resume Normal Links, Reuter Library Report, Feb.
24, 1988 (am cycle) (NEXIS); New Zealand Foreign Minister Visits Paris, Xinhua General Overseas
News Service, Mar. 6, 1988 (item no. 0306065) (NEXIS).
34 Fontaine, Rocard Plan Offers Real Hope for New Caledonia, Manchester Guardian Weekly,
July 3, 1988, at 12 (NEXIS).
35 D'Antonio, French Premier to Visit South Seas Separatist Bastions, Reuter Library Report,
Aug. 24, 1988 (am cycle) (NEXIS). See also supra note 5.
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voting age by 1998, to vote in the referendum. 6
. Fyi
In 1874, the island chiefs of Fiji unconditionally ceded the island
group to Britain.37 While under British control,38 many Indians were
brought into Fiji in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to
work in the cane fields.39 Soon there were more Indians in Fiji than there
were indigenous Melanesians.' The British, recognizing that this im-
ported population was altering the socio-political situation in Fiji, took
steps to preserve the power of the Melanesians.41 Over eighty percent of
the land was reserved exclusively for Melanesian ownership.42 More-
over, when the British granted Fiji independence in 1970, the British-
sponsored constitution effectively guaranteed that at least eight of the
twenty-two members of the Senate would be nominated by Melane-
sians.43 The constitution also provided a voting system for the lower
house that favored the selection of Melanesians.
44
Melanesians controlled the government from 1970 to 1987, 4 but on
April 11, 1987, the first government to include the Indian-majority party
came to power.46 On May 14, 1987, Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka of the
Royal Fijian Armed Forces staged a coup in which he overthrew the
democratically-elected coalition government.47 Rabuka's claimed goal
was to "ensure perpetual control of [government] by indigenous Fiji-
36 Carton, New Caledonia Marathon Ends in Agreement, Manchester Guardian Weekly, Aug.
28, 1988, at 13 (NEXIS).
37 Gordon, supra, note 11, at 76. Mara on Mission to Restore Fiian Links with British Crown,
Reuter Library Report, Mar. 25, 1988 (pm cycle) (NEXIS) [hereinafter Mara on Mission]. Britain
subsequently annexed the islands. The Numbers Game, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 26, 1987, at 60
(NEXIS).
38 Fiji was a British Colony from 1874 to 1970. Gordon, supra note 11, at 76.
39 Gordon, supra note 11, at 76. The long idle Fijians refused to work, so the British "im-
ported" Indians to work in the cane fields for a five year stint. At the end of five years, many of the
Indians chose to stay. Id. See also Fijian Army Leader Stages 2d Coup, supra note 1.
40 The Numbers Game, supra note 37.
41 See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text for a list of several means by which the British
sought to protect Melanesian power.
42 Van Dyke, The Cultural Rights of Peoples, 2 UNIVERSAL HUM. RTs. 1, 15 (1980). "When
Fiji was a British colony, Britain reserved about 83 percent of the land of the islands to the indige-
nous Fijians, prohibiting the purchase of this land by others. Independent Fiji maintains the system
and safeguards it against change by special constitutional provisions." Id.
43 Fiji CONST. § 45(1)(a), reprinted in V CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD
(Fiji) 56 (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz eds. 1986). See also The Numbers Game, supra note 37.
44 Id. "[Tihe House of Representatives would be filled by a partly communal system of voting
that also favoured the Melanesians." Id.
45 The Nasty Side of Paradise, Manchester Guardian Weekly, Oct. 4, 1987, at 1 (NEXIS).
46 Id.
47 Mingshan, Year Ender: National Aspirations Stirring in South Pacific, Xinhua General Over-
seas News Service, Dec. 30, 1987 (item no. 1230077) (NEXIS).
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ans. ' ' 48 After five days, Rabuka stepped aside and allowed the Governor-
General, Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau, to exercise his executive powers as
head of state.49 Ganilau, with an interim council of advisors, was to run
the everyday affairs of Fiji and to seek a solution to its political
problems.50 On September 25, 1987, three days before a compromise bi-
partisan caretaker government 51 was to have come into power, Rabuka
staged another coup, claiming that the proposed government would not
ensure Fijian, ethnic self-determination. 2
Initial international reaction to the September coup was generally
unfavorable. The United States, Australia, New Zealand, the United
Kingdom and several of the smaller Pacific Islands states denounced the
coup.5" Queen Elizabeth II of the United Kingdom, pursuant to her
power as "Queen of Fiji," asserted that her Governor-General, Ganilau,
was "the sole legitimate source of executive authority in Fiji."5 4 Most
states, in accordance with the Queen's view, chose to recognize the Gov-
48 Filan Army Leader Stages 2d Coup, supra note 1. Most commentators assumed that the
indigenous Fijians and Colonel (now Brigadier General) Rabuka were not confident that this coali-
tion would protect the needs of Melanesians, although it was led by a native Fijian Melanesian, Dr.
Timoci Bavadra. The Nasty Side of Paradise, supra note 45. However, a late 1987 report questioned
this assumption:
In reality. ... the deposed coalition government of the multiracial Fijian Labour Party
and Indian-led National Federation Party had been supported by many poorer Melane-
sians.
The two-year old Labour Party, led by Dr. Timoci Bavadra, . . . was viewed by the
traditional aristocracy of chiefs as a threat to their entrenched power. This was despite a
decision by Dr. Bavadra's government to leave sensitive cabinet posts in Melanesian hands.
Even though Indians slightly outnumber other Fijians, Indian domination of the econ-
omy is more apparent than real.
Fifi Racial Tensions "Exaggerated for Coup," Financial Times, Nov. 11, 1987, at 6 (NEXIS) (sum-
marizing a Nov. 11, 1987 report by the Minority Rights Group).
The Constitution of 1970 declares that only persons who have a male progenitor, himself the
son of two Fijian parents, is a Fijian. Fiji CONST. § 134(a).
49 Sherwell, Fiji's Military Coup Ends Peacefully, Financial Times, May 20, 1987, at 48
(NEXIS)[hereinafter Fifi's Military Coup]. As Fiji was a member British Commonwealth in May
1987, the Governor-General, as representative of Queen Elizabeth II, the Queen of Fiji and titular
head of state of the Fiji Islands, was the constitutional source of executive authority in Fiji. See
Raines, supra note 12; Sherwell & Mauthner, Dilemma for Governor as Fi Talks Fail, Financial
Times, Oct. 6, 1987, at 24 (NEXIS).
50 Ffi's Military Coup, supra note 49.
51 The proposed government would have been an interim body which would have eased the
way for a democratic change to the Fijian constitution. The government would have consisted of
equal numbers from the two main political parties, but no prime minister. The Governor-General
would have probably chaired the sessions of this body. Pauley, Caretaker Coalition to Govern Fii,
Financial Times, Sept. 24, 1987, at 4 (NEXIS).
52 FUian Army Leader Stages 2d Coup, supra note 1.
53 See id. (for the reaction of the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom); see New
Zealand and Australia Resume Aid to Fii, Reuters Library Report, Feb. 9, 1988 (pm cycle)
(NEXIS) (for New Zealand's reaction).
54 Raines, supra note 12. See also supra note 46 and accompanying text. As Queen Elizabeth
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ernor-General as the source of power in Fiji." The United States urged
that "'reasonable leaders in Fiji' should continue to work for a broad-
based government protecting the rights of all Fijians."5 6
In early October 1987, Rabuka proclaimed Fiji to be a republic 5 7 but
retained absolute control over the government.5 8 The improbability of a
return to constitutional government forced the Governor-General to re-
sign.5 9 Ganilau stated that, "My endeavors to preserve constitutional
government in Fiji have proved [to be] in vain, ... I can see no alterna-
tive way forward."6 ° Acceptance of this resignation by the Queen termi-
nated Fiji's links to Britain,6" and contributed to the chain of events
which resulted in Fiji's expulsion from the Commonwealth later in Octo-
ber 1987.62
In December, Rabuka stepped down as head of state, and appointed
the former Governor-General, Ganilau, as President.63 Ganilau was able
is the head of state of the Commonwealth, she is considered head of state of each Commonwealth
nation. The Governor-General serves as the Queen's representative.
55 Roy, Situation in Fi, 87 DEP'T ST. BULL., No. 2129, at 81 (1987).
56 Colonel Says Ethnic Fijians Will Be Given Power, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1987, at A5, col. 1.
57 Governor-General of FUi Resigns, Xinhua General Overseas News Service, Oct. 15, 1987
(item no. 1015189) (NEXIS). A "republic" is "a government having a chief of state who is not a
monarch and is usu[ally] a president... [or] a government in which supreme power is held by the
citizens entitled to vote and is exercised by elected officers and representatives governing according
to law." MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 594 (1978).
Since Rabuka retained absolute power in himself, see infra note 58 and accompanying text, it
must be assumed he meant the first definition of "republic" - one "having a chief of state who is not
a monarch." See id.
58 U.S. to Resume Aid To FUi, Send Ambassador, Associated Press, Feb. 16, 1988 (am cycle)
(NEXIS) [hereinafter U.S. to Resume Aid to Fij].
59 Rockingham, Commonwealth Nations Will Decide ifFji's New Ruler is Worthy, UPI, Oct.
16, 1987 (pm cycle) (NEXIS).
60 Id. (quoting statement of former Fijian Governor-General, Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau). See
also supra note 56 and accompanying text.
61 Rockingham, supra note 59.
62 See Commonwealth; One Down, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 24, 1987 at 51 (NEXIS).
Fiji was not expelled from the Commonwealth for becoming a republic.
As many as 27 Commonwealth countries have become republics, five have made their
own monarchs head of state, and lots have had military coups. For nearly 20 years it has
been accepted that membership can survive such events, and even that no application for
continued membership is necessary after a coup.
Id. Fiji's demise was more due to bad timing and poor diplomacy.
The coup in Fiji was an affront to the Queen (still the head of state in no fewer than 16
Commonwealth countries): it culminated in the ousting of a governor-general who is her
personal representative; when a republic's president is deposed, or even killed, that can be
shrugged off as his country's private affair. The Commonwealth governments also dislike
the idea of being asked to respect a constitutional change imposed by a soldier without due
process. And some are unhappy about Colonel Rabuka's declared aim of rigging his re-
public to favour one racial community.
Id.
63 US. to Resume Aid to Fii, supra note 58.
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to reinstate Sir Kamisese Mara as prime minister, but Rabuka main-
tained his control over security.64
Early in 1988, relations with the nations of the region and the world
began to improve. The United States recognized Fiji, sent an ambassa-
dor,65 and began to explore ways to resume the aid cut off after the May
coup.66 Both Australia and New Zealand also moved to resume aid to
Fiji,67 but unlike the United States,68 refused to recognize or normalize
relations with the government.69 Even France, despite its own problems
with indigenous uprisings in New Caledonia, agreed to send considerable
aid to Fiji.70
Britain also took steps toward improving relations with its former
Commonwealth partner by hosting the visit to London of President
Ganilau and Prime Minister Mara.71 The two leaders were granted audi-
ences with Prime Minister Thatcher and the Queen's Secretary, 72 a fact
which indicated tacit recognition of the new government.
64 Id. But see Fiji Premier Flies to England to Try to Restore Crown Link, Reuter Library
Report, Mar. 27, 1988 (pm cycle) (NEXIS). These reports suggest that the Prime Minister was also
appointed by Rabuka.
65 U.S. to Resume Aid to Fii, supra note 58.
66 Washington News, UPI, Feb. 16, 1988 (am cycle) (NEXIS). "The aid programs that were
suspended amounted to $1.325 million [in 1987]." Id.
67 New Zealand and Australia Resume Aid to Fiji, supra note 53.
The Australian Foreign Affairs Department said Fiji would receive about 10 million
dollars (seven million U.S.) in assistance over the next five months.
Fiji lost about the same amount in aid when Australia suspended its assistance pro-
gramme after last year's coups.
New Zealand's Foreign Minister Russell Marshall did not put a figure on its package,
although government sources said it would be worth about two million dollars (1.2 million
U.S.) a year - about one fifth of Wellington's previous assistance.
Id.
68 See Washington News, supra note 66 (sending of ambassador. Leonard Rochwarger to Fiji
restored full relations between Fiji and the United States).
69 New Zealand and Australia Resume Aid to Fifi, supra note 53.
Australia, which has never given its official blessing to the military-nominated govern-
ment of Prime Minister Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, smoothed the way for a resumption of
aid to Fiji by recognizing the country rather than the government last month.
In Wellington, Foreign Affairs Minister Marshall stressed the resumption of aid by
New Zealand did not mean a return to normal relations with [Fiji].
Marshall said in a statement the package did not contain any aid for the Fijian mili-
tary, which previously trained with New Zealand forces. ...
"Our fundamental objection to the two coups remains," he said.
Id.
70 France to Provide Aid to Fiji, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts/The Monitoring Report,
Feb. 24, 1988, at FE/W0014/i (NEXIS) (aid consists of $10.5 million in grants and concessions).
71 Mara on Mission, supra note 37.
72 Fiji: The Jewel is the Crown, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 9, 1988, at 42 (NEXIS).
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II. AMBIGUITY IN THE IDEAL OF SELF-DETERMINATION
The claims for self-determination made by the Melanesians in New
Caledonia and Fiji73 stretch the traditional limits of the doctrine of self-
determination.74 Wilsonian75 self-determination has three prongs: "a)
the right of a people to be free from alien rule... ('external' self-determi-
nation); b) the right of a people to select [their] own form of government
('internal' self-determination); and c) [the right of] continuous consent of
the governed ....
Historically, the word "self" has meant the people of a state77 as
opposed to the people of a nation.78 This notion was reinforced by the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples ("Colonial Peoples Declaration") 79 which recognized the state as
the basic unit for self-determination. This interpretation of "self" was
prompted by concern that states emerging from colonial domination
would themselves become fragmented.8°
A. The "Self" in Self-Determination: Nation or State
Nearly [seventy] years ago a Professor of Political Science who was
73 See generally Part I of this Note for background on the islands.
74 See Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than
States, 32 Am. U.L. REv. 1, 50 (1982)("There is a great reluctance to extend [self-determination] to
minorities.").
75 President Woodrow Wilson made self-determination a major issue at the Versailles Peace
Conference following World War I. See Humphrey, Preventing Discrimination and Positive Protec-
tion for Minorities: Aspects of International Law, 27 C. DE D. 23, 23-24 (1986).
76 Pomerance, Self-Determination Today: The Metamorphosis of an Ideal, 19 ISRAEL L. REV.
310, 314-15 (1984).
77 "State" generally refers to a territory whose population is controlled by a government with
the capacity to enter into foreign affairs. But "self" has been used in the context of people of colo-
nies and possessions, which for the sake of this Note's argument may be conglomerated with the
notion of "self" as pertaining to either a state or a nation. The state is the building block of the
present international legal system.
"Under international law, a 'state' is an entity that has a defined territory and a permanent
population, under the control of its own government, and that engages in, or has the capacity to
engage in, formal relations with other such entities." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 (1987).
78 A nation is a group of persons determined by a set of objective and subjective criteria such as
common ethnic background, shared history, language or religion and a subjective sense of common
destiny. See Dinstein, Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities, 25 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
102, 103-05 (1976).
79 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res.
1514(XV), 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960) [hereinafter Colonial
Peoples Declaration].
80 Nanda, Self-Determination Under International Law: Validity of Claims to Secede, 13 CASE
W. REs. J. INT'L L. 257, 275 (1981). "[A]I1 attempts [aimed] at 'the partial or total disruption of the
national unity and the integrity' of a state are prohibited." Id. at 275 n.124 (citing Colonial Peoples
Declaration, supra note 79). See also Dinstein, supra note 78, at 108-10.
19891
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L LV
also President of the United States, President Wilson, enunciated a
doctrine which was ridiculous, but which was widely accepted as a
sensible proposition, the doctrine of self-determination. On the surface
it seemed reasonable: let the people decide. It was in fact ridiculous
because the people cannot decide until somebody decides who are the
people.8s
As the above quotation reveals,8 2 the idea of "self" in self-determi-
nation is a slippery concept.83 Although the term "self" is used in many
ways, for the purposes of this Note the term is discussed in only two
contexts-"self" meaning people of a state versus "self" meaning the
people of a nation.84
1. "Self" as People of a State
In the aftermath of World War I, the Allied leaders undertook to
establish self-determination by the people of a nation, as a principle of
law in Europe. 5 Unfortunately, the commingling of the numerous na-
tionalities made the task of drawing boundaries, so as to give each of the
nationalities its own state, an impossibility.86 Many of the resulting
states cut across national boundaries.8 7 As a compromise, the new Euro-
pean states and governments set up after the war were "required to enter
into treaties with the Allied and Associated Powers under which they
would undertake ... to extend a measure of protection to their racial,
81 I. JENNINGS, THE APPROACH TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 55-56 (1956), quoted in Pomerance,
supra note 76, at 310.
82 See also supra note 77 and accompanying text.
83 Pomerance, supra note 76, at 311-12.
First and foremost, there is need to define the bearer of the right. Who is the "self"
to whom self-determination attaches? ...
Very early in the history of self-determination, the question of definition worried U.S.
Secretary of State Robert Lansing, who accompanied Wilson to Versailles in 1919. He
expressed his doubts in his diary in these terms:
When the President talks of "self-determination" what unit has he in mind?
Does he mean a race, a territorial area, or a community? Without a definite unit
which is practical, application of this principle is dangerous to peace and
stability.
Id. (citing Lansing, Self-Determination, SATURDAY EVENING POST, Apr. 9, 1921, at 7)(footnotes
omitted).
84 The reasons the discussion is limited to these two facets of "self" is twofold: (1) present
international law inertia favors "self" to mean state, and (2) the only other asserted position, which
embraces that which is asserted by the Melanesians in Fiji and New Caledonia, is "self" to mean
nation.
85 Humphrey, supra note 75, at 24. It must be remembered that the spark that set off the First
World War was "the murder [of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria] by a member of a disaf-
fected minority." Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
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religious and linguistic minorities. 88
This compromise sacrificed "internal" self-determination (the pro-
tection of people) for "external" self-determination (the protection of
states).8 9 As a result, the need to know exactly what people or peoples
comprised a state became secondary to the need for a state to be free
from external interference. In addition, the compromise exposed the fact
that national self-determination may be at odds with state self-determina-
tion and the concept of sovereignty. 90 The dissolution of the League of
Nations and the subsequent formation of the United Nations further un-
dermined the importance of a nation's right to self-determination.91
Moreover, the structure of the international legal system greatly favors
the rights of states over the rights of nations.92 Given the concept of
sovereignty and the primacy of external self-determination, nations have
had little, if any standing in the international order.
2. "Self" as People of a Nation
Although the state unit has become the principal international ac-
tor, rights9" of nations appear to be an emerging trend in international
88 Id.
89 Because the Allied and Associated Powers chose to relegate the protection of peoples to the
treaty process and not to base these new and emerging states upon the right of an individual people
to self-determination, the rights of individual peoples became secondary to the rights of states. See
Pomerance, supra note 76, at 314-15 for a further discussion of the decision made at Versailles
concerning external and internal self-determination.
90 Just such a concern was in mind when the Colonial Peoples Declaration was drafted to favor
the maintenance of territorial integrity over the risk of fragmentation that national self-determina-
tion would bring. See Nanda, supra note 80.
91 See Humphrey, supra note 75, at 25.
There is nothing in the United Nations Charter about what I have called the positive
protection of minorities; nor indeed are minorities even mentioned in the instrument., Nor
is there any mention of minorities in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights .... The
reasons usually given for the failure of the United Nations to assume any responsibility for
the positive protection of minorities, apart from the less than serious one that if the rights
of everyone are respected without discrimination, there will be no need to protect minori-
ties, are that the system as it operated under the League was discriminatory - as it indeed
was - and that it was abused by the Nazis. But the real reason for the failure of the
United Nations to take over any responsibilities in the matter of positive protection was
that most if not all states, did not and do not want to help minorities preserve their cultural
identity. They want to assimilate them.
Id.
92 See, eg., STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 34, para. 1.
93 Van Dyke, supra note 42, at 3.
The word right is ... troublesome. [A] right [refers to] an entitlement, a morally
justified claim, a need, or an interest justifying a presumption that it ought to be satisfied or
enjoyed unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary. As the last of these three
definitional phrases suggests, rights as a rule are not absolute. They may conflict with each
other, forcing judgments about priorities or adjustments. It follows that the measures that
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law.9 4 Neither the United Nations Charter nor the Universal Declara-
tion on Human Rights95 make any mention of minority or national
rights, 96 although both the subsequent Convention on the Prevention of
the Crime of Genocide97 and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights98 do mention these rights.99
The latter two documents affirmatively establish that nations have
internationally protected rights.l°° The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights does not embrace the concept of political rights of
nations,"1 but has helped establish the recognition of positive rights of
nations. ' 0 2
By itself, the Colonial Peoples Declaration 10 3 cannot be used to af-
firmatively establish the right to self-determination of nations, since no-
where in the text of the Colonial Peoples Declaration is the concept of
political rights of minorities specifically mentioned. However, the Colo-
nial Peoples Declaration does state "that all peoples have an inalienable
right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty and the integ-
rity of their national territory;'" This language, which seems to favor
national self-determination, is contradicted by the traditional reading in
which "peoples" means people of a state, not of a nation. 05 This lan-
can justly be taken to implement a right must be limited by due respect for other rights that
may be adversely affected.
Van Dyke, supra note 42, at 3.
94 See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200,
21 GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6319 (1966); International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
95 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, 3 U.N. GAOR C.3 (183rd mtg.)
at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810, (1948).
96 Humphrey, supra note 75, at 25. For the purposes of this discussion, national and minority
are acceptably equivalent.
97 See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 260,
U.N. Doc. A/810, at 174-77, art. 11 (1948) [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
98 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 94, at art. 27.
99 In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic racial or religious group, as such:
Genocide Convention, supra note 97, at art. II.
In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to
such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of
their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use
their own language.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 94, at art. 27.
100 See generally supra note 100 for the text of the documents.
101 See id. for the text of article 27.
102 Humphrey, supra note 75, at 26.
103 See supra note 79; Pomerance, supra note 76, at 319.
104 Colonial Peoples Declaration, supra note 79, at 67. The paragraph concluded by
"[s]olemnly proclaimfing] the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in
all its forms and manifestations." Id.
105 See Nanda, supra note 80, at 275.
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guage, coupled with the Third World's desire to end Western colonial
institutions, °6 has led to application of the Declaration whenever "colo-
nial and alien domination does in fact exist,"' 1 7 regardless of "the guise
of ostensible national unity."10 This use is bolstered by the Declaration
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-Operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations ("Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations")109 which
draws the line between territorial integrity of states and national self-
determination. 1'0
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing
or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally
or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and
independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the prin-
ciple of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described
above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole peo-
ple belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or
colour." 1
B. The Extent of Determination for Nations
As seen in part II(A)(1) of this Note, the state is still the primary
international actor. 2 Part II(A)(2) outlined the erosion of the state's
position due to the emergence of the nation as an actor, 13 but what bases
do the Melanesians in Fiji and New Caledonia have for their claims of
political self-determination? Do these claims fit within the window of the
Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations?
The preceding part of this Note" 4 showed that the Declaration
Concerning Friendly Relations and the Colonial Peoples Declaration
have been interpreted together by many states to allow some nations the
international political right of self-determination."' Problems in apply-
106 See supra note 104. The language of the Colonial Peoples Declaration is evidence of this
desire.
107 Espiel, The Right to Self-Determination: Implementation of United Nations Resolutions:
Study Prepared for the Sub-Committee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,
U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev. 1 at 10, para. 60 (1980).
108 Id.
109 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Oper-
ation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8018 (1970) [hereinafter Declaration Concerning
Friendly Relations].
110 See id. at 124.
111 Id.
112 See supra Part II(A)(1) of the text.
113 See supra Part II(A)(2) of the text.
114 Id.
115 See generally supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text for a description of this window.
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ing this principle have arisen because the emerging states, who are propo-
nents of Western decolonization, fear that acknowledgement of the right
to national self-determination of minorities will result in their own mi-
norities demanding self-determination, thus causing fragmentation of the
state. 1
1 6
A number of limitations have been sought on the meaning of "peo-
ples" in the Colonial Peoples Declaration. One minority view is that
paragraph six of the Declaration only applies to newly emerging states.
Therefore, "any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the
national unity and the territorial integrity of a country ... [would be]
incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter"' 7 and
would disallow national self-determination within newly emerged or
emerging states while allowing it in all others."'
Other attempts to curb minorities' rights of self-determination have
come through limitations on the scope of the Declaration, applying it
only to those minorities who are under colonial or alien domination,"1 9
despite specific wording pertaining to "all peoples."' z The key determi-
nation thus becomes whether colonial or alien domination exists.
The first step of the delineation was simple: a "salt-water test" was
applied.' 2 ' Any territory not contiguous with a state but controlled by
that state was deemed colonial.' 22 As a naked doctrine, the salt-water
test would label Hawaii and Alaska as colonial. However, the test must
be read in conjunction with the Declaration Concerning Friendly Rela-
tions, which says one cannot disturb the integrity of states within which
the "nations" are represented fully in government.12 3
The second step of the determination was also simple: a pigmenta-
tional or racial test was applied.'24 "[A]ny white or Western presence
outside Europe, North America or Australasia was deemed 'nonindige-
nous' - 'alien' or 'colonial.' 1,25
While the salt-water test and the pigmentation test do further the
process of decolonization, they are not a complete solution to the prob-
116 See generally Pomerance, supra note 76, at 321; Van Dyke, supra note 42, at 4-5. (Many of
the boundaries in Africa and Asia, being the vestiges of Western colonial presence, cut across na-
tional borders.) See also Nanda, supra note 80.
117 Colonial Peoples Declaration, supra note 79, at 7.
118 See Pomerance, supra note 76, at 318, n.15.
119 See id. at 320.
120 Colonial Peoples Declaration, supra note 79, at 67. But see Pomerance, supra note 76, at
320; Espiel, supra note 106, at 320.
121 Ponerance, supra note 76, at 321.
122 Id.
123 See Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations, supra note 109. Also see the text in supra
note 109.
124 Pomerance, supra note 76, at 321.
125 Id.
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lem. Peoples dominated by Indo-European colonialists are able to exer-
cise their self-determination while peoples dominated by their neighbors
are unable to do so. This disparity is the result of the inclusion of the
contradictory principles of "territorial integrity" and "self-determina-
tion" in the Colonial Peoples Declaration126 and the Declaration Con-
cerning Friendly Relations.
A modem and widely accepted interpretation of the Colonial Peo-
ples Declaration is that the reversion of territory to a previous sover-
eignty pursuant to historic claims is "a valid form of decolonization,
legally and morally." '127 Under this interpretation, the "territorial integ-
rity" guarantees of paragraph six of the Colonial Peoples Declaration do
not apply where there are valid claims of historic title.128 This approach
is more egalitarian than the other suggested approaches in that it makes
distinctions solely upon the basis of peoples' claims, and not upon the
politically maneuvered states' ideologic preferences.' 29 In contrast, the
salt-water and pigmentation tests have been used by emerging nations to
their own advantage so as to affect Indo-European actions and not their
own. 130
C. Conflicts and Resolutions
Fiji and New Caledonia differ in terms of external self-determina-
tion: Fiji is an independent state, while New Caledonia is a department
and an integral part of France. Furthermore, the United Nations has
called New Caledonia a territory of France.'31 With respect to internal
self-determination, the right of the people who live in Fiji to self-determi-
nation has been recognized, and although New Caledonia remains a
French department, even France has recognized the New Caledonians'
right to self-determination.' 32 Therefore, neither the right to external
self-determination nor the right to internal self-determination is at issue
with respect to Fiji and New Caledonia. What is at issue is the determi-
nation of who bears the right of internal self-determination.
126 Id. at 318-19.
127 Id. at 319 n.15. But see supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text for the principal con-
trary position.
128 Pomerance, supra note 76, at 319 n.15.
129 The other suggested methods, such as the one which protected new states (see supra notes
106-07 and accompanying text) and the salt-water and racial tests which targeted Western states (see
supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text) protected Third World interests in suppressing national-
ism while allowing the same group to erode the similar interests of the Western states.
130 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
131 See generally U.N. Calls on France, supra note 5.
132 Id. The French held a referendum on the independence issue in September 1987.
French U.N. Ambassador Pierre-Louis Blanc said, "There is no question of a refusal by France
to grant independence .... [I]ndependence would have been granted immediately [if the people of
New Caledonia had voted for it in September]." Id.
1989]
CASE W RES. J. INT'L LV
Paragraph seven of the Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations,
in its limitation of protection of state integrity to states whose govern-
ments "represent[ ] the whole people belonging to the territory without
distinction as to race, creed or colour," 133 should be a key determinant.
Under the Declaration, nations have the right to self-determination
where the government of the state does not qualify as exempt. If not for
paragraph seven, the nationalities134 placed in power in decolonizing ar-
eas, could obtain sole control, at the expense of other national groups and
thus circumvent the purpose of the Colonial Peoples Declaration.' 35 Of
course, even entrenched or imported persons could have power as long as
it was fairly shared.136
It is due to the Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations that in-
ternational response to the situations in Fiji and New Caledonia has been
markedly different. As seen in Part I of this Note, Fiji's assertions were
met with near universal condemnation by world powers, but those of
New Caledonia were supported by a great number of states. 137 While
this divergence might indicate a division along the lines of external versus
internal self-determination, it is more likely that the divergence is due to
the perceived existence of unbiased representative government, coupled
with the application of the salt-water test. In any event, both developing
and developed states favor this internal/external division because it keeps
their own indigenous minorities under control. 138
The world community sees the Kanaks in New Caledonia as polit-
ical outsiders in a territory controlled from Paris. This perception may
be due to application of the salt-water test, but the problem is real, as
evidenced by the coercive practices used by the French settlers in New
Caledonia against the natives.' 39 Also, the Kanaks' claims are tempered
with reasonableness. Although they claim that only native New
Caledonians may vote in any decision of independence, their definition of
native embraces all others with the exception of first generation set-
tlers. 14 This characterization would allow approximately eighty percent
133 Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations, supra note 109, at 124. In order to qualify as
exempt from scrutiny under the provision, a nation needs a non-biased, representative government.
134 These nationalities might be either pre-existing nations or imported nations, such as the
French in New Caledonia.
135 See Pomerance, supra note 76, at 318 n.15, for a discussion of reversion of title.
136 For New Caledonia, see supra notes 27-31. For Fiji, see supra notes 50-58.
137 For New Caledonia, see supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text. For Fiji, see supra notes
53-56 and accompanying text.
138 This political motivation is the fear that acknowledgment of such a principle would give
their own minorities a colorable claim of independence, and result in the break-up of their own
states.
139 See generally Part I(A) for a description of the relationship between the settlers and the
natives in New Caledonia.
140 Markham, supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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of the islanders of French descent to vote,14 1 and thus moderates the
harshness of the natives' claims. In the agreement between France and
the Kanaks for the 1998 referendum, the Kanaks have agreed to allow all
those persons in New Caledonia who are eligible to vote in 1988, plus all
those persons residing in New Caledonia in 1988 who will attain majority
in time for the 1998 referendum, to vote in the referendum.142
The claims of the native Fijians, however, have racial overtones. If
successful in their claims, the native Fijians would institute a class-based
society with native Fijian landowners1 43 who may vote and tenants who
may not vote. This system, based upon nonrepresentative government
biased on grounds of race, religion and pigmentation, 1" would be
apartheid in reverse. 145
D. Continuous Self-Determination
Despite the fact that Western and Northern powers are those who
generally lose out when self-determination is used to oust an entrenched
group, the East/West power struggle also pushes states to recognize the
natives' claims. For example, the United States claims to be the sup-
porter of democracy anywhere in the world. So in late 1987 and early
1988 when Fiji started to implement democratic reforms, there was great
pressure on the United States to recognize and assist the new regime,
although the government position with respect to the political rights of
non-Melanesians had not changed. 146 Perhaps, had the Soviet Union not
been active in cultivating "friends" in the area, the United States would
not have so quickly normalized relations with the new Fijian
government.
But where does that leave the system? Both the Kanaks and the
Fijians have made claims which concern the control of the whole terri-
tory of their states.147 What happens if they succeed?
In the short term, the native Fijians seem to have won. They have
control of a racial state and have effectively thwarted the internal self-
determination of a majority of the population. This in turn thwarts that
141 Markham, supra note 2.
142 Carton, supra note 36.
143 Van Dyke, supra note 42, at 15.
144 The proposed constitution in Fiji would permanently deprive "all non-native racial groups
... of their equal rights to participate in governing their country." Islam, The Proposed Constitu-
tional Guarantee of Indigenous Governmental Power in Fi. An International Legal Appraisal, 19
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 107, 108 (1988). As native Fijians are Melanesian Christians and most of the
non-natives are Indian Hindus, the government would be biased as to race, religion and
pigmentation.
145 It would be reverse in the sense that the group on top of the socio-political spectrum would
not be the Anglo-Saxon or English-speaking group, but rather the tribal minority.
146 See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text for the background.
147 See generally Part II of this Note.
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majority's ability to change their system of government through continu-
ous self-determination. 14' This situation is pure apartheid and will likely
produce conflict both within and without Fiji, as it has concerning simi-
lar practices in South Africa. The Fijians may not be so successful in the
long run.
The Kanaks have not been successful as yet, but should they be,
they will have a problem similar, though of lesser magnitude, to that of
the Fijians. If New Caledonia attains its independence after 1998 and
there is no significant flight of French settlers from New Caledonia, the
Kanaks will be unable to control New Caledonia without some sort of
restriction on non-Kanak power, due to the majority presence of the
French settlers.
These situations exemplify the problem of national self-determina-
tion where there is only one territory. The nation may not simply splin-
ter off, as did Pakistan and India. This problem is also evident in the
struggle between Israel and the Palestinians, neither of whom seem to be
willing to share the territory. The situations in both New Caledonia and
Fiji create such problems, but while the Fijians are closing the door on
solutions with repression, the New Caledonians, if successful, may find a
better way.
III. CONCLUSION
At present, there appears to be little possibility that indigenous, mi-
nority political self-determination will be accepted as an international
legal norm in the near future, unless a state qualifies under paragraph
seven of the Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations. Cultural self-
determination may already be accepted, but the grave threat which polit-
ical self-determination of native minorities presents to the integrity of
representative states and to the international legal system will deter states
from acquiescing to the natives' claims without more. However, just as
the once seemingly impregnable Western colonialism dissolved with the
entrance of Third World powers into the United Nations, so may the
longstanding suppression of natives by stronger groups within their terri-
tories fade away in the face of increasing levels of education, increasing
availability of world news and the outcome of the New Caledonia situa-
tion.
John T. Paxman*
148 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
* J.D., Case Western Reserve Law School, 1989.
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